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The Well-Tempered Judicial Decisiont
Roger J. Traynor*
Like many another stereotype, that of an appellate judge as an
umpire is deceptive in its simplicity. A judge who contents him-
self with being an umpire is no true judge. He is only a transmitter
of the prerecorded rules that he learned in some class of yore and
that he would find painful ever to unlearn. He would qualify only
in a neat little plot where nothing ever changed.
A true judge must be much more than a transmitter, for the
diamond he presides over is a diamond in the rough. For the most
part he may rest easy as an umpire, invoking time-honored rules.
Recurringly, however, the patterns and processes of the game un-
dergo significant change, even though the name of the game does
not. For a long time such change may not seem worth noticing;
then comes a day when it no longer can be ignored. The right field
or left field may have expanded until there is nothing left of the
center, and if there remains a center fielder, he is clearly an anach-
ronism. Or, instead of such attrition, something new may make the
scene permanently, perhaps a fifth base that doubles as a second
home.
The alert judge is aware that such dramatic changes can strain
old rules to the breaking point; yet he is also mindful that he must
make haste slowly, in the interest of orderly transition, from a
doomed rule that was either inept from its inception or has outlived
its usefulness to an emergent rule whose aptness has yet to be
tested. The promulgation of a new rule must be skilfull timed if
tempered to th u icial pr ess. Such timing is important to miti-
ardhipofadjstent to a new rule. Some measure of
adjustment is of course inevitable.
Normally a new judicially created rule operates retroactively
and hence governs the instant case. Occasionally a judge finds
t An address delivered at the University of Arkansas School of Law,
May 9, 1967.
* Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California.
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himself compelled to limit it to prospective operation, denying its
benefit to one party or the other in the instant case. One party for
example may have justifiably relied on the old rule, in the absence
of warning signs that its demise was imminent, and is exempted
from the new rule to preclude a hardship upon him that
substantially outweigh the hardshipD incurred by'--dned
t.een eti tteni ue
In contrast with the normally retroactive operation of judi-
cially created rules, new legislative rules normally have prospective
operation only, reflecting an enduring skepticism about ex post
facto laws. Nevertheless, the legislature can engender problems of
transition when it promulgates a new rule in a statute and failsto
specify its scope in time or s ecifies it in such a way as to raise con-
stitutiona uesios
ase by case, the judge articulates the needed transitions from
old rules to new whether they proceed from a judicial decision or
from a statute, in what might be called a series of graded readers
whose scope increases with each new factual situation. The process
of transition, however, is bound to reflect historical and institu-
tional differences between a legislature and a court, as salient as
ever despite the widening responsibilities of each that narrow the
distance between them. Hence we can better understand how a
judge makes transitions in the law if we first take account of those
differences.
By the seventeenth century it was an accepted rule of statu-
tory construction in common-law courts that statutes operate only
prospectively. The rule bespoke the conviction of lawyers and
judges that retroactive operation would be inherently unfair. By
the time of Blackstone that view had evolved into the principle
that statutes e.erateprospctivelyb their veryna . A statute
could not be effective before it was eAd d
not a ly to eve s that recede ' t. These views
drosse e ocean and became the basis of the ex post facto clause
and the impairment of contracts clause in the United States Consti-
tution.8  The due process clause also served to preclude certain
1 "[I]n many fields of human action there is no reliance on past deci-
sions and in many others no knowledge of the existing law. 'The picture
of the bewildered litigant lured into a course of action by the false light of
a decision, only to meet ruin when the light is extinguished and the deci-
sion overruled, is for the most part a figment of excited brains.' But some
reliance there undoubtedly is, and how much a court can only guess, so it
is a consideration which cannot properly be disregarded." Schaefer, Prec-
edent and Policy, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 3, 15 (1966). The quotation is from
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 122 (1924).
2 See generally Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A
Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MVINN. L. REv. 775 (1936); Comment,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts,
71 YALE L.J. 907, 907-909 (1962); Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Over-
ruling Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 121 (1940). The principle that statutes
operate prospectively only, originally part of the Roman law, was declared
by Bracton in 1250 and incorporated from this source into the English com-
mon law by Coke. The English courts subsequently developed the princi-
ple as a rule of construction. See Smead, supra at 775-777.
3 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9 (3); U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10 (1).
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types of retroactive legislation, particularly those that afforded no
opportunity for notice or fair hearing.4 Thus, a statute that re-
duced the period for adverse possession from twenty years to six
after a six-year period had already run against the owner was held
void as a taking of property without due process of law.5
The courts, however, did not regard all retroactive statutes
as evil. They found some, such as curativeatatutes, necessary or
desirable. They have tolerated retroacivity in such fields as taxa-
tion for practical reasons. The intricacy of modern tax acts and
their administration, together with the endless problem of segregat-
ing interests originating in the past from those of the future, have
impelled the courts to uphold retroactive application of tax laws in
a wide variety of situations. They have consistently sustained tax
laws enacted in year X to apply from the beginning of year X. Tax
laws have often made partly retroactive changes in the basis of
property; they have made nontaxable exchanges taxable; they have
made deductible expenses nondeductible. Tax regulations nor-
mally apply retroactively, with exceptions for hardship cases. There
is substantial tolerance of retroactivity in estate taxation; transac-
tions entered into throughout a lifetime are evaluated at the date
of death, which may be long after the transactions were closed and
at a time when revenue needs and theories of taxation have
changed.8 Nevertheless, such examples of retroactivity are still ex-
ceptions to the rule of prospective operation for statutes. For the
most part they dare not look back lest they turn into a pillar of
unconstitutionality.
No such lot awaits judicial decisions, which normally operate
retroactively. The mundane explanation is that a judicial deci-
sion, relating to events that have s
b ckward. It makes a grea eal of common sense, if taken with
he essential grain of salt, that a judicial decision is not hopelessly
backward. A judge is bound to make constant use of the eyes at
the back of his head, but he has also a responsibility to keep a
weather eye forward.
I take my stand with this modern view the better to emphasize
the need for some exceptions to the common-sense rule of pre-
dominantly retroactive operation of judicial decisions. For all too
many generations we justified such retroactivity by the prim lore
descended to us through Blackstone that judges do no more than
discover lay.thtarvelously has always existed a aitin only thejuicia pen tha woul imd te rh words or it for al o eed.7
0 ce suitably bundled up 1 as automatically retroactive, iven
4 See cases summarized in Smead, supra note 2, at 795 (n. 63).
See, e.g., Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877).
5 Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913), discussed in
Smead, supra note 2 at 795.
6 See generally, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 592
(1935). A leading case is Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
7 See Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1960) .
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the premise that it had been there all along in the bushes at the
bottom of the garden. The devotees of the discovery theory majes-a
tically dispelled the fractious problem of the overruled decision.
The overruling decision simply displaced it all the way back in time,
so that it never had a life it could call its own. Under the spell of
such moonspinning American courts soon upheld a retroactive oper-
ation of decisions that they would have invalidated in statutes as
contrary to the ex post facto clause, the impairment of contracts
clause, or the due process of the Constitution.8
Like many another myth, the myth that judges discovered
rather than created law, surviving well into the twentieth century,
engendered rituals that have outlived it. The ritual of mechanical
retroactivity of judicial decision came to have its own rationaliza-
tions, affording no leeway for exceptions. The conv ' h a
new judicial rule is more *ust than an old one ar
t - ea inference that suachievesmaum j11tice
by retroactive app cation. here are no questions asked about
countervailing injustice to those who have relied on the old rule.
There are also no mind-jolting comparisons with a new statute,
which may also be superior in justice to a judicial rule that it dis-
places, but which will ordinarily be construed to have prospective
operation only.
We might well quit ourselves of superficial rationalization
for retroactive operation of judicial rules, admitting of no excep-
tions, for we can better justify their retroactive operation, admit-
ting of reasonable exceptions, by the very reasoning that justifies
stare decisis as a prevailing principle, admitting of reasonable
exceptions.
Stare decisis signifies the basic characteristic of the judicial
process that differentiates it from the legislative process. In the
legislative process there is neither beginning nor end: It is an end-
less freewheeling experiment, without institutional constraints,
that may have rational origins and procedures and goals or that
may lack them. In contrast, a judge invariably takes precedent as
his starting-point; he is constrained to arrive at a decision in the
context of ancestral judicial experience: the given decisions, or
-lacking these, the given dicta, or lacking these, the given clues.
Even if his search of the past yields nothing, so that he confronts a
truly unprecedented case, he still arrives at a decision in the con-
text of judicial reasoning with recognizable ties to the past; by its
kinship thereto it not only establishes the unprecedented case as a
precedent for the future, but integrates it in the often rewoven but
)always unbroken line with the past.
8 See, e.g., Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 450-451, 455 (1924),
holding that no due process or other federal question is raised nor is there
infringement of the impairment of contracts clause when a state judicial
decision divests property or contract rights; Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150
(1913) and Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) holding that the ex post
facto clause does not apply to judicial decisions; Central Land Co. v. Laid-
ley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895), holding that judicial decisions do not fall within
the impairment of contracts prohibition. See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 389 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
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A judge is constrained not only to heed the relevant judicial
past in arriving at a decision, but also to arrive at it within as
straight and narrow a path as possible. Unlike legislators, he can-
not undertake broad investigations beyond the case before him,
even if it might clarify some of its ramifications. He is confined
by the record in the case, which in turn is confined to legally rele-
vant material, limited by evidentiary rules. So it happens that
even a decision of far-reaching importance concludes with the
words: "We hold today only that. . . . We do not reach the ques-
tion whether. . .. "
The very circumspection of the judicial process enhances the
significance of a decision. No one is apt to take it lightly, knowing
how intently a judge must hew to the record before him. It offers
no reforestation or defoliation program, but what it decides about
asin le tree May ive new erthefies n e
igh escribe the 1 ea , ewl-epred ju icial decision, as one
that affords such perspective. It is not laden with ancient phrases
harking backward; neither is it freighted with seven-league words
for an ambitious march on the future. The well-tempered decision
knows how to take graceful leave of a dark landmark that is no
longer on its mark, but takes care to refrain from all-purpose /
guidance for all that lies ahead. It knows how to keep its place in
time."
Such a decision affords a court a modicum of flexibility within
its severe constraints. Insofar as it remains uncommitted to the
more drastic implications of a decision, it gains time to inform itself
fu[ther thr a dgcases. It is thef better situatedo re-
trea advance with a minimum of shock to the evolutionary
course of the law, and hence with i~ht ittiiii~?Fof Ii tot hose who
act in reliance upon judicial decisions. The greatest judges of the
common law have proceeded in this way, moving not by fits and
starts, but at the pace of a tortoise that explores every inch of the
way, steadily making advances though it carries the past on its back.
T o tn h icial rocess, perhaps too summarily
summarized as stare decisis, not only benefits the long-range evolu-
tion of the law, but also affords substantial protection against
arbitrary judicial decision. We can deem it an advance that many
of our appellate judges at least, now have tenure that insures their
independence from powerful or popular groups. Any risk of ar-
bitrary decision that attends such independence can be minimized
by qualification commissions such as now operate in a few states.
Moreover, the legislature is always free to ''dca e
with its own stat . ever ,e prevailing influence of
p ece emamns the most effective insurance against arbitrary
decisions.
No modern judge adheres to precedent ritualistically, but in
the main he honors it for good reason, for the endlessly useful solu-
9 See Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security; The Well-
Being of the Law, 53 CAL. L. REV. 151, 158-159 (1965); cf. Breitel, The Law
Makers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 765-767 (1965).
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tions it makes available to him by way of example as he confronts
each puzzle to which something new has been added. If the puzzle
still proves intractable to solution in familiar ways, a judge is still
likely to do honor to precedent in the breach, setting forth clearly
the disparity between the square facts before him and the usually
benign well-rounded precedents that now fail to encompass them.
He has also the nsilt ojustif the new precede he
has evo ye o erel as the ds
bes of possible replacements.
He is hardly eager to take on so demanding a responsibility if
he can do otherwise. He knows that a new rule must be supported
by "the full disclosure in his opinion of all aspects of the problem
and of the data pertinent to its solution. Thereafter the opinion
must pass muster with scholars and practitioners on the alert to
note any misunderstanding of the problem, any error in reasoning,
any irrelevance in data, any oversight of relevant data, any prema-
ture cartography beyond the problem at hand. Every opinion is
thus subject to approval."10
Moreover, however moribund he finds a precedent, he may still
be deterred from displacing it by another restraint of judicial of-
fice, the tradition that the function of courts is not to innovate
changes but only to keep the law responsiveto significant changes
in the customs of the communitV. Normally he will abide "by the
tenet-that the law must lag a respectful pace back of popular mores
not only to insure its own acceptance but also to delay legal for-
malization of community values until they have become seasoned." 1
The legislature may well undertake the requisite formalization of
seasoned community values. If the legislature fails of that re-
sponsibility, 12 however, a judge may eventually find it incumbent
upon him to articulate rules responsive to long prevalent values
and customs.13
When a 'u oes overrule a judicial precedent, it matter
little whet r it d only to common to he terpItI
tion oa onst uti n or sta . na statute itself has codified
rules o c mmon)Aw, and in any event a judge arrives at his deci-
sion via r o g native to the common law. Hence the context
of the case does not affect the prevailing rule that an overruling
decision operates retroactively.
There are exceptions. A judicial decision may for good reason
specify that it is to have prospective application only. Before con-
sidering the why of a prospective overruling decision, we must
10 Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITU-
TIoNs TODAY AND TOMORROW 52 (1959).
I1 Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do it Justice, 49 CAL. L. REv. 615,
621 (1961).
12 See Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Leg-
islatures Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 797 (1963); Traynor, The
Unguarded Affairs of the Semikempt Mistress, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 491-
495 (1965).
13 See Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and The
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56, 60 (1965).
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understand that it is the culmination of a process involxirgAQ
asues. First in the course of pondering the hitherto governing
rule in the context of the instant case and any relevant predecessor
cases, a judge decides that it is inadequate or inept and must give
way to an appropriately formulated new rule. Heon
e le. If he ec es against retroactive
app ication, as n a case where it would work undue hardship upon
a party that has justifiably relied on the old rule, he is driven a
d resolution IMf the problem in a bifureated isoantnunemg
lienew rule for prospective applicat 1 o hy and allowing the old
rule to apply in the case before him.
The very announcement of the new rule for prospective appli-
cationonly, sounds the death knell of the old one. At the same
time the decision conveys the message that the winning party wins,
not on the basis of a rule marked for liquidation budespite it; the
concern is not to penalize him unjustly for relying on a rule whose
liquidation he could not reasonably foresee.
Each part of the bifurcated decision sprnsfo te eisl
The eci o o iqui -ate the oldF re- ings from its unfitness to
govern such cases. The decision to pay final respects to the doomed
rule springs from such considerations as the justifiability of a par-
ty's reliance on an old rule, given that it may induce reliance by the
very authority of its existence, if not by its fitness. it bears empha-
Is e%- assento xP =4 *al Molution o te
case. either is dictum.uOne part of the decision announces a new
Irue~a will in e ure supersede the old one and govern such
cases as the instant one. The attendant part adds that the decision
will have no retroactive application. The transitional case marks
the end of the old rule and signals the forthcoming application
of the new.'4
Amid the current lively interest in the prospective operation of
an overruling decision, it is worth recalling various decisions spec-
ifying such operation, covering a long space of time.'5 They have
a common objective, to preclude undue hardship to a party that
has justifiably relied on the old rule.
Thus the early municipal bond cases, to prevent gross injus-
tice, precluded retroactive application of new rules. In 1863 the
United States Supreme Court in G jelpckev CituJof Dubuoue'o re-
fused to give retroactive effect to adecision of the Supreme Court
of Iowa holding certain municipal bonds invalid, noting that plain-
tiffs had purchased such bonds in reliance on an earlier decision
of that court holding them valid. In 1879 in Douglass v. County
14 See Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35
ILL. L. REV. 121, 151 (1940).
15 Professor W. Barton Leach has discovered a case dating back to
1675 that denied retroactive application to a new rule. LEACH, PROPERTY
LAW INDICTED 16-17 (1967).




of Pike" it explicitly applied prospectively a rule invalidating
municipal bonds in a situation similar to Gelpcke. In its words:
"After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the con-
struction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it are
oncerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a
hange of decision is to all intents and purposes the same in its
ffect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a[
egislative enactment.""8 From this language state courts and fed-
eral courts subsequently carved out a "contract right" or "property
right" to preclude retroactivity. The objective was to foster stabil-
ity in commercial transactions.
Other early cases limiting new rules to prospective application
in the interest of justice also involved property rights. Thus, in
1892 the Alabama Supreme Court, ruling in Jones v. Woodstock
Iron Co.19 on the vesting of legal title to property, took care to give
its rule prospective application only. Similarly, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1906 approved the prospective application for de-
cisions overruling settled rules of property or contract rights, on
the ground that the "highest principles of justice" militate against
divestment of rights acquired in reliance on prior law.2 0
The leading case of Great No. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.
Co.2 1 involved a Montana statute that granted rate fixing authority
to the state railroad commission. The Montana Supreme Court had
authorized a right of reparation to shippers or carriers affected by a
modification of a rate schedule as unreasonable. Sunburst had
accordingly sued Great Northern for reparations. Then the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, overruling its earlier decision, held that the
right of reparation did not exist. Nonetheless it permitted Sun-
burst to recover because the old rule had been "the governing prin-
ciple for shippers and carriers who, during the period of its reign,
had acted on the faith of it." 2 2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether Great Northern had been
denied due process and held that no federal question was raised
by the prospective overruling.
The legislative divorce cases afford another early exception to
the retroactive application of a court decision. Thus the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in holding legislative divorces invalid, refused to
apply its decision retroactively to invalidate prior legislative di-
vorces that had been granted over a period of more than forty
years. The court noted that retroactive application would have
invalidated numerous second marriages and rendered illegitimate
many children born of such marriages. 23
17 101 U.S. 677 (1879) .
18 Id. at 687.
19 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892) .
20 Hill v. Atlantic & N.C.R. Co., 143 N.C. 539, 55 S.E. 854 (1906).
21 91 Mont. 217, 7 P.2d 927, aff'd. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
22 287 U.S. 358, 361 (1932).
23 Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848), discussed in Prospective
Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J.
907, 916-917 (1962); cf. Rosensteil v. Rosensteil, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E. 709(1965), discussed in LEACH, PROPERTY LAw INDIcTED 20-22 (1967).
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Courts have made other exceptions to retroactivity in the in-
terests of justice. The United States Supreme Court held in an
abstention case that a state court decision on a controlling federal
question barred relitigation of that question in the federal district
court unless the party expressly reserved the federal question in
the state court.2 4 The Supreme Court declined, however, to apply
the rule to the parties since they had litigated the federal question
in the state court in reliance on a distinguishable Supreme Court
decision. The court noted that only one commentator had correctly
understood the meaning of the decision on which the plaintiffs had
relied. The court's refusal to penalize the plaintiffs for their mis-
taken reliance on its own decision was eminently fair. The detri-
ment to the defendants of nonretroactive application was minimal;
they lost only time and a procedural defense.
Sometimes a court tolerates indefinitely the vicious circle of a
defective old rule and reliance thereon, even though the old rule
may have been unsound from its inception. An early California
decision,25 based on the rule that a wife had no vested interest in
community property, begot a subsequent decision that muddled this
dubious rule with language suggesting that any diminution of a
husband's rights would be a taking of property without due proc-
ess.2 6 Still later, the cumulative muddle culminated in a soapstone
tablet. The California Supreme Court precluded the retroactive
application of legislation affecting rents, issues, and profits of com-
munity property on the constitutional ground that it would be a
taking of property without due process. 2 7 I concurred in the rul-
ing, not on the spurious constitutional ground, but because the
widespread reliance on an old rule of property weighed heavily
against retroactivity.
The decision against retroactivity, a right result on the wrong
ground, gave a longer than usual reprieve to an old rule of property,
but such a result was inevitable given the volume of marital prop-
erty transactions in California that antedated the new legislation.
In concurring, I noted that in any future decision on the retroac-
tivity of legislation affecting community property, the court should
abandon the untenable constitutional ground of due process and
relate its decision to legislative objectives and the factor of reliance
on old rules of community property. It is unnecessary to strike
down retroactivity with the force of the Constitution when the fact
of reliance on a long entrenched rule of property will do. It hardly
becomes the law to develop propensities for overkill.2 8
24 England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S.
411 (1964), discussed in Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law:
Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 251-252 (1965).
25 Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 311 (1860). See also In re
Burdick, 112 Cal. 387, 393, 44 P. 734, 735 (1896).
26 Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
27 Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944).
28 See Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Comms-
nity Property Control--Rule of Property or Constitutional Necessity?, 33
CAL. L. REV. 476 (1945); Comment, 27 CAL. L. REV. 49 (1938).
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Reliance of course plays its heaviest role in such areas asprp-
contracs aanntsxnnwles Usse..ltyerxdise clieiit exten-siveY- eir panigo the basis of exist ingde'isions., Its sig-
nificance is correspondingly less in areas that do not involve such
planning. There is nothing comparable in other fields to the deed,
the contract, or the estate plan that brings the heads of lawyers and
clients together over the rules of His and Hers, the customs of Bar-
ter and Bargain, or the dual Deems nestling dos-i-dos between the
lines of the Internal Revenue Code.
n torts, for example, neither e tortfeasor nor th...ictim
norihally ta es account of ex andin or contractingrule
it m y develops by retroactive application, amplifying the
concept of duty or the concept of fault in a case that becomes an
example rather than an exemption. 29 Nonetheless, a pioneering
case, as in other areas, rests not on some abstract Ought and naught
else, but on an evaluation of competing interests.
In most cases, the expansion or contraction of tort liability has
no drastic effect on the drafting and cost of insurance policies, but
there are exceptions. An agency, for example, relying on sovereign
or charitable immunity under established law may well deem it
needless to procure insurance. In the event of a judicial decision
ruling against such immunity such an agency would be unprepared
to meet the newly created liability.
Decisions in many jurisdictions overruling sovereign or charita-
ble immunity have sought to guard against undue hardship in this
regard, but not always satisfactorily. Thus in Illinois the court ac-
corded the benefit of a decision overruling school district immunity
to the plaintiff, but declared that apart from the instant case, the
rule would apply prospectively only.30 Such a solution can result
in grossly unequal treatment of persons similarly situated. It was
bound to raise the question of why there should not be comparable
benefit for others, including those injured in the same accident,
whose potential claims were not yet barred by the statute of limita-
tions or litigated to a final judgment that would raise the bar of
res judicata.
A court may decide for retroactive operation as the most just
solution, everything considered. The California court so decided,
in a decision liquidating the doctrine of sovereinimm * ayx3 It
reasoned that the doctrine had been almos uiiio yi1 condemned
by the commentators, and had become so riddled with exceptions,
by legislation as well as judicial decision, that "Only the vestigial
remains of such governmental immunity have survived; its requiem
29 See Currier, supra note 24, at 244.
30 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11,
163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
31 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961);
see also Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alas. 1963).
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had long been foreshadowed."3 2 Under such circumstances any
hardship to the agency that had failed to take note of the fatal ill-
ness of the old rule was overwhelmed by the hardship that a denial
of recovery would have worked on the injured plaintiff.
Nothing is lost and much is gained when a court meets its re-
sponsibility for the overruling of unsound judicial doctrine. It not
only promotes the orderly development of judicial decision in the
direct resolution of judicial controversy, but thereby also estab-
lishes modern rules pending any legislative action. It may even
prove the prime impetus to such action. Thus in California the
decision overruling sovereign immunity spurred the legislature to
fix a period during which the new rule was held in abeyance, 3 and
in this period it proceeded with diligence to enact comprehensive
legislation in the area, including rules to govern its retroactivity.8 '
The Minnesota court straddled the issue of prospective versus
retroactive operation with a third solution. It declared that the de-
fense of sovereign immunity would no longer be available to school
districts, municipal corporations, and certain other governmental
subdivisions with respect to torts committed after the adjournment
of the next regular session of the Minnesota legislature.35 Its ob-jective was to give the agencies time to insure and to leave the
way open for the legislature to enlist its abundant resources for
comprehensive legislation in the area.
Recurringly in constitutional law, as in such an area as im-
munity, the courts directly overrule a defective precedent, a judi-
cial responsibility consistent with the responsibility remaining to
the legislatures for comprehensive lawmaking. A salient example
is the case of Brown v. Board of Education,3 6 holding that the state
action involved in segregated schools constituted a denial of the
Equal Protection Clause. Normally, state action that has been de-
clared unconstitutional would be promptly terminated. Given the
massive adjustments necessitated by the decision, however, the
United States Supreme Court framed its decision in terms of the
now famous equitable injunction calling for compliance "with all
deliberate speed."37
Eight years went by. Then the court, in the 1963 case of
Watson v. City of Memphis,38 held that enough time for deliberate
speed had elapsed and that desegregation must now proceed in
earnest. It noted that "even the delay countenanced by Brown
was a necessary, albeit significant, adaptation of the usual principle
that any deprivation of constitutional rights calls for prompt recti-
32 MUSkopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 221, 359 P.2d 457,
463 (1961).
83 CAL. STAT. 1961 ch. 1404.
34 CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 810-996.6 (1963).
35 Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962).
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
87 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
8 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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fication .. .0."3 9 It added that "The second Brown decision is but a
narrowly drawn, and carefully limited, qualification upon usual
precepts of constitutional adjudication and is not to be unnecessarily
expanded in application."40
The extraordinary technique of the Brown decision, allowing
an unspecified time for adjustment, was the only possible way of
insuring orderly transition from an old social order to a new. Mil-
lions of people were involved in the transition, and they could
hardly be maneuvered at a moment's notice like small platoons of
plaintiffs or defendants. There would be adjustments to make for
those who had clamored for change as well as for those who had re-
sisted it. Each group needed time to expand its familiar province
and to learn to live in a wider world. The judicial decision signal-
ling the change was no simple decision weighing one individual's
benefits or hardships against another's. It contemplated a long-
range benefit for everyone concerned, and abundant time was of the
essence to insure that objective. There would have been great risk
of its failure had the court ordered its decision to take effect at an
appointed hour or even in an appointed year. Better an interim of
trial and error, however bumbling, with time and time again to
heal the breach.
Whether a decision announces a new rule for prospective appli-
cation only, or makes it retroactive, the problems of transition
are not always neatly resolved in a transitional case. The legisla-
ture may enter the picture, for example, with ideas of its own for
transition. It may prescribe a new transitional lease on life for a
precedent that has been overruled by judicial decision. There is
little question that it is competent to do so in the wake of a decision
overruling a rule of common law or statutory interpretation, which
involves only questions of fairness and policy.
What of the judicial decision that overrules retroactively a
judicial construction of the state Constitution? Can the legislature
then restore the old construction for a transitional period? This
question arose in California in sequence of a judicial decision over-
ruling a judicial precedent hitherto governing the taxation of pri-
vate leaseholds in tax-exempt public property. The decision held
that the old rule violated the state Constitution.4 1 After taking ac-
count that the element of reliance on the old rule had entered into
the negotiation of the leases, the court concluded that it did not
countervail the public interest in the proper leving of.taxes..and
accordingl ave the new rl eratv plcto otecs
before 1 . e egislature then came into the picture and restored
the51id rule on a reduced schedule, prescribing that it should con-
tinue to govern leases negotiated prior to the overruling decision.
39 Id. at 532-533.
40 Id. at 533.
41 De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d
544 (1955), overruling Blinn Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 216 Cal.
474, 14 P.2d 512 (1932).
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A judicial test of this legislative action then followed in For-,
ster Shipbuilding Co. v. County of Los Angeles.42 Although the
legislative action circumscribed the operation of the new constitu-
tional rule, it nevertheless recognized its finality by making its own
limitation a temporary one. Hence the court concluded: "[TJm
porary aplication of t fa n
teLegislature is no ess en than the court to evalu the
hardship ivolved a ec1 ether cosatons of fairness
d public pl'ywrat teganm frelief."143
The propriety of such legislative relief thus turned on its lim-
ited objective of cushioning adjustment to a new rule, an objective
that did not militate against the rule itself and that was reasonably
confined by the terms of relief. Nevertheless, it is worth considering
the basic question that arose in this narrow context, harking back
to the rule f Marbury v. Madison"4 that with the court alone rests
te to ae-te eretation o ~p CohlItttiion. Did the legislature
arrogate t is function to itself when it too action to ease the transi-
tion from an old judicial rule to the new?
There was no true arrogation, for the constitutionality of the
legislative acti n was still subject to judicial review. Moreover
the court itsel did not m retroactivit a consti ' ndate.
It viewed retr c iv y as a pro em turning on considerations of
f irness and olicv, considerations that are as much the concern of
S s ature.e two
arymg points of view thereon, as it would be to have conflicting
rules of constitutionality. The fact that th u i elf could rop-
erly make its new constitutional rule prospective on v n irms
hehe l s-l totn kewise. The very action
ta en by the legis ature or prospec ive operation constitutes an
acknowledgment of the judicial rule as the last word, constitution-
ally speaking.
Cases may of course arise in which r 'vit is a co titu-
tional ' .rative, and the court spegifies t as such. n such a case
the egislature would be ound by the retroaciv y of the rule as
much as by the rule itself as the last word.
Our foremost legislature is of course Congress. In cases in
which lretroactivit is not a constitutional ative, jtL wmi,1d
seem that Congrss as ree om a e a.SpeeCutil
42 54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d 736 10) (JAih4t tro
48 Id. at 459, 353 P.2d at 741.CirL- (k
44 5 U.S. (1 Cr anch) 137 (1803) . ,* -st I/
45 A bill (H.R. 2508, § 2) now pending in the United States Senate
would postpone until 1972 the full impact of the decision that congressional
districts be apportioned according to the "one man, one vote" principle.(Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8, 18 (1964)). It would permit congres-
sional elections to be held even in states having a 35% disparity among
districts. Since the United States Supreme Court itself authorized federal
courts to weigh equitable considerations in timing the redistricting in the
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It is relatively simple to consider the possibilities of setting a
judicial rule by legislative time in terms of a state legislature in re-
lation to a state's highest court or of Congress in relation to the
United States Supreme Court. It is confoundedly relative to con-
sider such possibilities in terms of a state legislature in relation to
the United States Supreme Court, assumi ess remains
silent. That query we leave to another ay, preferably a long one.
The factors that recurringly militate against the retroactivity
of an overruling decision in constitutional law are nowhere of
graver import than in criminal cases, where the freedom or very
life of the defendant is at stake. These cases, now so prominently
in the foreground because of the accelerating innovation of new
rules of criminal procedure, present many complexities. The special
problems they encompass, ranging from criminal detection to crim-
inal detention and trial, resist mechanical assimilation into the
broad problem of prospective versus retroactive application that we
have reviewed here. Hence I have enlarged upon them elsewhere.46
It remains our common task, in every field of the law, to foster
the well-tempered judicial decision. It is much more than a prime
insurance against those excesses of savagery or refinement that
can blight the law, and our lives with it. It is a transformation of
the dead letter of the law into the living language of justice.
states (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)), it would seem that
Congress also can weigh those considerations and fix the timing of the
redistricting.
46 See Traynor, Conflict of Laws in Time: The Sweep of New Rules
in Criminal Law, 1967 DuKE L.J. 715 (Brainerd Currie Lecture, delivered
at Duke Law School, May 11, 1967).
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